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Myopia, Regrets and Risky Behaviors
Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthierey
April 21, 2009
Abstract
This paper examines how a government should intervene when agents
make, for di¤erent reasons, choices that have long term detrimental e¤ects
on their survival prospects. We consider an economy where some agents
make risky choices (here sin good consumption) out of myopia, and regret
their choices later on, whereas other agents make, because of their impa-
tience, the same risky choices, which they never regret. We argue that,
in the rst-best, a government should only interfere with behaviors that
agents regret, but not with other behaviors. In the second-best, asym-
metric information and redistributive concerns imply interference not only
with myopic behaviors, but also with impatience-based behaviors. Finally,
we introduce heterogeneity in individual productivity, and show that the
optimal tax on the sin good depends on the size of the myopic group, on
the reactivity of sin good consumption to tax changes, and on the extent
to which sin good consumption is correlated with labor earnings.
Keywords: self control, risk taking, optimal taxation, sin goods, my-
opia, impatience, regrets.
JEL codes: I18, J18, H21, H31.
1 Introduction
Undoubtedly, the consumption of "sin goods" - i.e. goods that generate in-
stantaneous satisfaction at the cost of worse future living conditions - is an old
practice, probably as old as religions, morals or State laws aimed at regulat-
ing such activities. Drinking, smoking, having unprotected sex or committing
crimes are probably as ancient as mankind. While sin good consumption is an
old practice, it still prevails today, and to a signicant extent, as illustrated by
Figure 1, which shows the levels of yearly alcohol consumption per head and
the prevalence of tobacco use around the world.1
Note that the inter-country heterogeneity on both dimensions is large: al-
though some countries, like Ethiopia, exhibit very low levels of consumption of
University of Liege, CREPP, CORE, PSE and CEPR.
yEcole Normale Superieure, Paris, and PSE.
1Sources: World Health Organization, WHO Statistical Information System, retrived on
01/12/2008 at http://www.who.int/whosis/data/.
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Figure 1: Alcohol and tobacco consumption in the world.
sin goods (less than 1 liter of alcohol per person, and only 4.3 per cent of smok-
ers), consumption is far larger in other countries: Hungary, for instance, exhibits
an alcoholic consumption of 13.6 liters per person per year, and a smoking preva-
lence of 39.6 per cent. But besides those large cross-country di¤erentials, the
drawing of a basic tendency line suggests that there seems to be, at least at rst
glance, some positive correlation between tobacco and alcohol consumptions,
pointing to some form of "sin" lifestyle.
The existence of "unhealthy" lifestyles raises di¢ cult policy issues for gov-
ernments, as various empirical studies showed the negative inuence of several
sin goods on health and longevity, inviting some public intervention. For in-
stance, the negative impact of cigarettes on health and longevity was shown by
Doll and Hill (1950) and various subsequent studies (see Kaplan et al, 1987),
while the negative inuence of alcoholism was stressed by Poikolainen (1982).2
Those ndings can be conrmed by a quick look at aggregate data. In the case
of smoking, Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between the consumption of
cigarettes per person and the proportion of smoking-related deaths.3
Empirical evidence showing the negative impact of sin goods on health has
made governments intervene, and, in particular, has motivated a heavy taxation
of sin goods. Note, however, that the actual impact of sin goods taxation on sin
goods consumption has been far from unambiguous. For instance, if one looks at
the relationship between the taxation of tobacco products and the consumption
of tobacco across countries, it is far from obvious that taxation contributes to
reduce smoking behavior. As illustrated on Figure 3, the comparison of the total
tax rates on tobacco products and the consumption of cigarettes in Europe for
2Note that demographic studies on the impact of sin goods do not concentrate exclusively
on alcohol and tobacco, but focused recently on the impact of excessive or inadequate eating
(Bender et al, 1998; Stamler, 1973).
3Sources: World Health Organization, Regional O¢ ce for Europe. Retrived on 01/12/2008
at http://data.euro.who.int/tobacco/.
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Figure 2: Cigarettes consumption and smoking-related deaths in Europe.
2005 does not yield the - expected - negative relationship between taxation and
consumption of sin goods.4 On the contrary, drawing a regression line yields
a rather at, but positive relationship between tobacco taxation and tobacco
consumption, unlike what is expected.5
Tobacco and tobacco taxation in Europe
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Figure 3: Tobacco products taxation and smoking prevalence in Europe.
Despite its simplicity, Figure 3 su¢ ces, nonetheless, to highlight two crucial
points. First, it suggests that, although all European governments apply high
tax rates on tobacco products (between 55 and 80 per cent), there remains a
4Sources: World Health Organization, Regional O¢ ce for Europe. Retrived on 01/12/2008
at http://data.euro.who.int/tobacco/.
5However, such a positive relationship should not be interpreted as reecting an incapacity
of tobacco taxation to reduce smoking, as such a diagnosis could only be made in the light of
cautious econometric analysis based on time series or panel data.
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large smoking prevalence. Second, countries with the same tax rates on tobacco
can achieve quite di¤erent smoking prevalence rates. The observed di¤erentials
are likely to reect a large heterogeneity of lifestyles across countries, hetero-
geneity that is also likely to exists within countries, some people being more
willing to consume sin goods than others, despite heavy taxation.6
Those two observations - a large average prevalence and a large heterogeneity
despite heavy taxation - cannot be neglected when considering the issue of the
optimal taxation of sin goods. Clearly, when examining the design of the optimal
taxation of sin goods, one cannot avoid to ask to oneself what motivations lie
behind the observed consumption of sin goods. Large prevalence rates may be
due, for instance, to myopia, in the sense that agents tend to ignore the negative
e¤ects of sin goods consumption on future health.7 But sin goods consumption
may, on the contrary, be due to - fully rational - risk-taking behavior, some
people considering that it is their own choice to take risks if they want so, while
knowing all possible future consequences of their current actions.
Myopia and rational risk-taking are two distinct ways to explain the con-
sumption of sin goods. Those two kinds motivations underlying ones behavior
lead often to the same decisions, which amount to give little importance to the
lagged detrimental e¤ects of behaviors that bring instant gratication. Thus,
sin goods consumption can be actually interpreted as resulting either from a
myopia that prevented agents from anticipating the impact of their behavior on
future welfare, or, alternatively, from a - fully rational - risk-taking behavior.
However, there is a big di¤erence between those two motivations underlying
risky behaviors. Myopic agents are characterized by a constant tension between
their two selves, that of instant gratication and that of long term welfare.
Ex post, when facing the negative e¤ect of their past consumption, they regret
their past decisions. Hence, they would welcome a government forcing them to
behave with a balanced concern for both short-run and long-term interests. On
the contrary, rational risk-takers do not experience such a duality, and, given
the absence of regret, there is no reason for interfering with their choice.8
The coexistence of regretting and non-regretting sin good consumers has
been emphasized by empirical studies on the prevalence of regrets among smok-
ers. By means of a telephone survey of a representative sample of U.S. respon-
dents, Slovic (2001) found that 85 % of adult smokers stated that they would
not start smoking if they had to do it over again. In the U.K., Jarvis et al
(2002) showed that about 83 % of smokers "would not start smoking if they
had their time again". Finally, Fong et al (2004) showed, on the basis of a tele-
phone survey in Canada, the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, that about 90 % of
smokers agree with the statement "if you had to do it over again, you would not
6On the heterogeneity of smokers, see the recent study by Grignon (2007), who shows that
inconsistent time preferences lead to a higher smoking prevalence ceteris paribus.
7Note that the widespread feeling of invulnerability among young adults and adolescents
(see Quadrel et al, 1993) can be regarded as a form of myopia, that is, an ignorance of the
consequences of ones actions.
8Ex post, the risk-taker would say I gambled and I lost and I have no regrets.The myopic
would say: I was overwhelmed by my immediate self but I would have liked to be refrained
from it in the name of my long term interest.
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have started smoking". All this suggests that regrets, although widespread, are
not expressed by all sin good consumers, conrming the diversity of attitudes
towards sin goods consumption ex post : some risk-takers are myopic risk-takers
with regrets, whereas others are merely regretless risk-takers.
That diversity of ex post attitudes towards past sin goods consumption be-
havior raises some important issues for the policy maker.9 Clearly, even under
the assumption that those behaviors do not create externalities on other mem-
bers of society (which is not the case of smoking or unprotected sex), it is not
obvious to see whether a government should interfere or not. And if yes, should
it interfere in the same way towards myopic and rational individuals?
The goal of this paper is precisely to examine whether and how the gov-
ernment should interfere when individuals make choices that have long-term
detrimental e¤ects, but for di¤erent reasons. For that purpose, we develop a
two-period model where the probability of survival from the rst period of life
(young adulthood) to the second period (old age) depends on sin good con-
sumption when being young.10 For simplicity, the population is assumed to be
composed of three types of agents: (1) farsighted agents, (2) myopic risk-takers
(with regrets ex post) and (3) rational risk-takers, who are guided here by their
impatience (but without any regrets ex post).11 Thus this paper characterizes
the optimal taxation of sin goods in a context where heterogeneous agents can
behave in a similar manner, but for di¤erent reasons.12
Whereas it could be argued, from an "old" paternalistic perspective, that
both myopic and rational risk-taking agents do not behave in their best interests,
we shall consider here that the di¤erent attitudes of agents ex post invite a
distinct treatment of the two types of agents by the government, even though
their behavior is exactly the same. By doing so, we are in conformity with
what can be called a "new" paternalism, as opposed to the "old" paternalism.
Indeed, old-style paternalism would recommend a similar treatment of rational
risk-takers and myopics, on the grounds that risk-taking is "bad", whatever the
underlying motivations are.13 Against that view, new paternalism recommends
a distinct treatment of rationals and myopics, taking the di¤erent motivations
9A good way to sort out the two types of risk-takers would be to observe their behavior in
case of vote on a tax (or even a prohibition) on the sin good. The regretless risktakers would
denitely vote for a tax equal to zero. In contrast, the regretful myopics, assuming that they
are sophisticated, would vote for the tax (or even the prohibition), which they perceive as a
commitment device (see Cremer et al, 2007).
10Note that, in the context of a two-period model with endogenous death after young
adulthood, there is little room for regrets in period 2 (as one is then dead), so that regrets
are assumed to take place at the end of period 1.
11We are well aware that having a high impatience and having a low risk-aversion are two
distinct aspects of human personality. While these two traits can be both regarded as implying
risk-taking behaviors, we shall here use the former rather than the latter, as this is more
convenient for analytical purposes. But note that assuming agents with distinct risk-aversions
would not a¤ect our conclusions, as these only presuppose that a given risky behavior causes
regrets among some people (type-2 agents), and no regret among others (type-3 agents).
12As such, this paper is a complement, on the normative side, of recent behavioral studies
on risk-taking and myopia among young adults (see ODonoghue and Rabbin, 2000).
13But such a paternalism seems hardly justiable, as this relies on a questionable set of
"good" and "bad" things established independently from what people think.
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into account. From that point of view, governements should not interfere with
rational risk-takers (as long as no externalities are involved), but there is some
ground for intervening in the case of the myopics (i.e. their regrets).
This paper adopts the new paternalistic view, and characterizes the optimal
public policy under a diversity of motivations. In the rst best, a new pater-
nalistic government should interfere only with myopic risky behaviors (to avoid
regrets), but not with rational risky behaviors. Hence, the government should
only induce myopic agents into behaving with concern for the long-term. How-
ever, in the second best, particularly when agents di¤er not only in terms of
myopia but also of income, asymmetric information and redistributive concerns
may imply interference with rational risky behaviors as well.
At this stage of our inquiry, it may be worth underlining some restrictions
of the present study. First, we shall leave aside externalities associated with the
consumption of sin goods, and concentrate on sin goods that only a¤ect agents
own welfare. Secondly, this study shall not consider the problem of addiction.14
Note, however, that the addiction motive - past choices being irreversible - can
be interpreted as a kind of myopia, because the anticipation of future addiction
would probably, for a farsighted agent, prevent him from consuming addictive
sin goods. Third, we shall limit the instruments of the government to a tax and
transfer policy, and leave aside other forms of intervention.15
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic
model, where agents of three types - farsighted, myopic and impatient - choose
their consumption of a sin good (impatience being taken as a proxy for risk
taking behavior). Section 3 characterizes the rst-best optimum, and studies its
decentralization. The second-best problem is examined in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 adds a second source of heterogeneity - productivity - and studies the
optimal linear taxation problem. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 The basic model
2.1 Environment
We consider a population of agents who live, at best, two periods. The rst
period is lived with certainty, whereas the second period is lived with a prob-
ability . That probability of survival depends negatively on the consumption
of a sin good, denoted y, through the survival function
 = (y)
with 0(y) < 0 and 00(y) > 0:
In the rst period, agents allocate their (xed) earnings between current
consumption, c, saving, s, and the sin good y, which brings immediate utility
but has a negative e¤ect on the probability of survival to the second period .
14On this, see Orphanides and Zervos (1995), Gruber and Koszegi (2000, 2002) and Sura-
novic et al (1999).
15Alternative interventions include: education, information campaigns, age restrictions, etc.
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The society is composed of three types of agents:16
 Type-1 agents are farsighted ;
 Type-2 agents are myopic, but with a dual self: they would like, ex post,
to have been forced to behave as farsighted (i.e. regrets ex post);
 Type-3 agents are impatient ; they do not care about the future (without
any regret ex post).
Note that the impatience of the third type of agents is only an analitycally
convenient way to express rational risk-taking.
In terms of the time preference factor i weighting the second-period utility
of agents, the factors of type-2 and type-3 agents 2 and 3 cannot be distin-
guished on the basis of the rst-period choice. The only thing we know is that
2 = 3 < 1. Throughout this paper, we shall, for simplicity, assume that
type-2 and type-3 agents act in such a way that they do not assign any weight
to the second period: 2 = 3 = 0.
2.2 The laissez-faire
An agent of type i = 1; 2; 3 chooses the rst-period and second-period consump-
tions of the normal good ci and di, as well as the consumption of the sin good
yi, in such a way as to maximize his expected lifetime utility subject to his
budget constraint, the utility of death being normalized to zero. It is assumed,
for simplicity, that a perfect annuity market exists, and that there is a zero
interest rate, so that the return on savings is 1=i. Moreover, individual utility
is assumed to be quasi linear in rst-period consumption for conveniency.
Hence, the problem of each agent of type i can be written as the maximiza-
tion of
max
ci;di;yi
ci + v(yi) + i (yi)u(di)
subject to the constraint
ci + yi + di(yi)  w
where v(yi) is the utility derived from the consumption of the sin good, while
w is the income endowment of the agent.
The FOCs yield
1 = 
iu
0(di) = 
v0(yi) + i0 (yi)u(di) = (1 + 0 (yi) di)
16We shall denote by ni the number of agents of type i = 1; 2; 3:
7
Given that 2 = 3 = 0, we have
u0(d1) =
1
1
d2 = d3 = 0
v0(y1) = 1  0 (y1)1 [u(d1)  u0(d1)d1] > 1
v0(y2) = v0(y3) = 1
From this, it is not di¢ cult to see that agents of types 2 and 3 save nothing,
as the second period does not matter for them, contrary to type-1 agents, who
save some resources. Moreover, agents of types 2 and 3 consume also the same
amount of sin good y2 = y3, which is higher than the one consumed by type-1
agents. The reason why y1 < y2 = y3 is that type-1 agents care about the
negative impact of the sin good on the probability of survival, unlike type-2 and
type-3 agents, who do not care, ex ante, about period 2. As a consequence,
agents of type 1, by choosing a lower consumption of sin good, have also a
higher survival probability than type-2 and type-3 agents, who have a low and
identical survival probability: 1 > 2 = 3:
Note, however, that although agents of types 2 and 3 make, under 2 = 3,
exactly the same choices, the motivations underlying those choices di¤er. Agents
of type 3 are fully rational and consistent: at the end of period 1, when they
face the level of the survival probability 3 < 1, they express no regret: this is
the mere result of their choice and their impatience, to which they still adhere
(in other words, they would be willing to act again in the same way if some
time-traveling machine existed). On the contrary, agents of type 2, when facing
2 = 3 < 1, express regrets: their myopia did not allow them to see the
impact of sin good consumption on the survival probability, and, if they could
go back to their youth, they would act di¤erently from what they did, and would
opt for a lower sin good consumption.
3 The rst-best problem
3.1 The rst-best optimum
Let us now consider the problem faced by a utilitarian social planner, who wants
to maximize social welfare. The problem of the planner can be written as the
choice of ci, di and yi for i = 1; 2; 3. The social planner does not want to
interfere with the choices of the agents of types 1 and 3, as those agents are
acting in a consistent way, that is, without any regret. On the contrary, the
social planner would like to correct the myopia of agents of type 2.
As a consequence of those two concerns, the social planner will, in his op-
timization problem, x the time preference parameters of the di¤erent agents,
denoted, for simplicity, by i, as follows. The planner xes 1 at a level equal
to the level of 1, and the parameter 3 at the level of 3 (i.e. 3 = 3 = 0).
However, the social planner xes 2 at a level di¤erent from 2. The reason
why the social planner acts in that way is that he would like to prevent type-2
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agents from regretting their choices ex post. Hence, in order to avoid a situation
where type-2 agents regret their past choices and envy type-1 agents at the end
of the rst period, the planner xes, in his problem, 2 = 1 > 2.
The Lagrangian of that problem can thus be written as
$ =
X
i=1;2;3
ni fV [ci + v(yi) + i (yi)u(di)]   [ci + yi + (yi)di   w]g
where V (:) is a strictly concave transform, while  is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint.
The FOCs yield
V 0(xi) = 
V 0(xi)i (yi)u
0(di) = (yi)
V 0(xi) [v0(yi) + i
0(yi)u(di)] = (1 + 0(yi)di)
where xi denotes the argument of the transform V (:). Note that all types of
agents have here the same expected lifetime utility, as x1 = x2 = x3.
Hence, given that 3 = 3 = 0, we have
u0(di) =
1
i
; i = 1; 2
d3 = 0
v0(yi) = 1  i0(yi) [u(di)  u0(di)di] ; i = 1; 2
v0(y3) = 1
so that
d1 = d2 > d3 = 0
y1 = y2 < y3
Thus, in the rst best optimum, type-3 agents do not consume anything in
the second period, contrary to types 1 and 2. Both types 1 and 2 consume
a small amount of sin goods, while type 3 consumes a higher amount. But
resources are distributed in such a way that the expected lifetime utility is,
from the point of view of the social planner, equalized across all types, as we
have x1 = x2 = x3.
3.2 Decentralization
To see how the social optimum can be decentralized, let us now compare the
FOCs under laissez-faire with the ones under the rst-best.
Clearly, the social planner does not need to interfere with the choices of
agents of type 1, as there is a perfect identity between the FOCs under laissez-
faire and at the rst-best for that type of agents. The same is also true for
agents of type 3. However, the planner must interfere with the choice of type-2
agents, and at two levels: the savings decision and the sin goods consumption.
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Actually, the laissez-faire level of second-period consumption, equal to zero,
is inferior to the rst-best level, which is strictly positive, because 2 > 2 = 0.
Thus, in order to decentralize the rst-best optimum, the government must
force type-2 agents to pay a tax T2 in the rst period, and uses this to nance a
pension P2 in the second period, which is given only in case of survival. Provided
T2 and P2 are equal to17
T2 =  (y2) d2
P2 = d2
this forced pension system for type-2 agents induces the rst-best consumption
path. Indeed, type-2 agents still choose to have no savings under that system,
but their second-period consumption is now equal to the pension P2. Note,
however, that this pension system does not a¤ect the consumption of the sin
good, as we have quasi-linear utility in y. Thus the pension system fT2; P2g is
necessary but not su¢ cient for the decentralization of the optimum.
Regarding the decentralization of the rst-best optimum of sin goods con-
sumption, let us notice that the FOC for the rst-best level of y2 is
v0(y2) = 1  0 (y2)2 [u(d2)  u0(d2)d2]
whereas, under a tax 2 on y2, the laissez-faire level of sin goods is characterized
by
v0(y2) = 1 + 2
Hence, the rst-best level of sin good consumption can be decentralized by
means of a tax 2 equal to
2 =  0 (y2)2 [u(d2)  u0(d2)d2] > 0
where d2 and y2 take their rst-best levels. This tax depends positively on 2,
and is thus increasing in the degree of myopia of the agent. The tax depends
also on the sensitivity of the survival probability to the consumption of y.
Thus, under the forced pension system fT2; P2g and the tax 2, type-1 and
type-2 agents have, under laissez-faire, exactly the same allocations. This will
prevent type-2 agents from envying type-1 agents ex post.
Finally, note that, in order to achieve the equality of marginal social utilities,
the implementation of the rst-best may also require some lump sum transfers
across groups 1, 2 and 3. However, given that those three types of agents have
the same endowment, one could argue that the role of the government should
be restricted to the (forced) pension system fT2; P2g and the Pigouvian tax 2
on the sin good, in the name of responsibility.
17Note that d2 and y2 take here their rst-best levels.
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4 The second-best problem
4.1 The second-best optimum
Let us now consider the second-best problem, in which the social planner cannot
observe the types of agents. Under such a limited observability of types, it is
likely that type-2 agents will pretend to be type-3 agents, in order to escape
from the forced savings system proposed by the planner. Indeed, even though
this forced pension system is built for the good of type-2 agents, those agents
cannot realize, ex ante, that such a system would be good for them, and might
prefer pretending to be of type-3.
The Lagrangian of the second-best problem can be written as
$ =
X
i=1;2;3
ni fV [ci + v(yi) + i (yi)u(di)]   [ci + yi + (yi)di   w]g
+ [c2 + 2 (y2)u(d2) + v(y2)  c3   2 (y3)u(d3)  v(y3)]
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility
constraint.
As above, the social planner xes, in the social objective function, 1 =
1, 3 = 3, and 2 > 2, in such a way as to correct for type-2 agents
myopia.18 Note, however, that, within the incentive compatibility constraint,
the time preference factor used consists of the parameter 2, i.e. the degree of
farsightedness of agents of type 2 at the time of their decision. The intuition
behind this is that, when deciding whether they pretend to be of type 3 or not,
type-2 agents are still subject to their myopia (as for their other decisions).
The FOCs yield
(V 0(x1)  )n1 = 0
(V 0(x2)  )n2 +  = 0
(V 0(x3)  )n3    = 0
(V 0(x1)u0(d1)  )n1 = 0
(V 0(x2)u0(d2)  )n2 = 0
d3 = 0
V 0(x1) [v0(y1) + 0(y1)u(d1)]  (1 + 0(y1)d1) = 0
n2 [V
0(x2) [v0(y2) + 0(y2)u(d2)]  (1 + 0(y2)d2)] + v0(y2) = 0
n3 [V
0(x3)v0(y3)  ]  v0(y3) = 0
From the rst three FOCs, we have
V 0(x1) = 
V 0(x2) =   
n2
V 0(x3) = +

n3
18We assume also, for simplicity, that 2 = 3 = 0 as above, and that 1 = 2 = :
11
Those equalities imply: x3 < x1 < x2. Type-2 agents have, at the second-
best, a higher utility than type-1 and type-3 agents. Given that this was not
the case at the rst-best, where x3 = x1 = x2, it follows that type-2 agents
tend to benet from asymmetric information at the expense of type-3 agents.
Substituting those expressions in the FOCs for savings yields
u0(d1) =
1

u0(d2) =
1
1  n2


d3 = 0
From which we have: d3 < d2 < d1. Note that type-2 agents have here a
lower second-period consumption than under the rst-best, to an extent that
depends on the curvature of the utility function. This change with respect to
the rst-best comes from the incentive compatibility constraint. Given that
type-2 agents do not see, ex ante, the relevancy of second-period consumption,
the social planner proposes a lower d2 than at the rst-best, to prevent them
from pretending to be of type 3.
Regarding the consumption of sin goods, we have
v0(y1) = 1  0(y1) [u(d1)  u0(d1)d1]
v0(y2) = 1  0(y2)

1  
n2

[u(d2)  u0(d2)d2]
v0(y3) = 1
Thus we have y1 < y2 < y3: Hence, whereas, at the rst-best, type-1 and type-2
agents were treated similarly, this is no longer the case here, as type-2 agents
enjoy a higher level of sin good consumption than type-1 agents. Here again,
this change is due to the incentive compatibility constraint.
Comparing these FOCs with the rst-best FOCs, we can see that
yFB1 = y
SB
1
yFB2 < y
SB
2
yFB3 = y
SB
3
Type-1 agents consume, at the second-best optimum, the same sin good
quantity as in the rst-best. However, the second-best optimum involves a
higher consumption of sin goods for type-2 agents, in such a way as to prevent
them from pretending to be of type 3. Note that the sin good consumption of
type-3 agents is the same as in the rst-best.
But this does not imply that type-3 agents are not a¤ected by the introduc-
tion of the incentive compatibility constraint. Actually, in comparison with the
rst-best, type-3 are made worse o¤, while type-1 agents keep the same level of
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utility, whereas type-2 agents are made better o¤:
xFB1 = x
SB
1
xFB2 < x
SB
2
xFB3 > x
SB
3
Thus the social planner, by preventing type-2 agents from pretending to be
of type 3, o¤ers them a basket that will, at the end of the day, make these
better o¤ than type-1 and type-3 agents. The latter are the victims of this, as
type-3 agents see their welfare falling in comparison with the rst-best optimum.
Actually, given that type-3 agents have a lower utility, but keep the same sin
good consumption and the same saving as in the rst-best, it must be the
case that these enjoy a lower rst-period consumption than at the rst-best.
Hence reducing the rst-period consumption of type-3 agents appears to be the
strategy adopted by the social planner to solve the incentive problem.
4.2 Decentralization
As in the rst-best, the decentralization of the second-best involves a forced
savings system for type-2 agents, that is, a rst period tax T2 and a second-
period pension P2 such that
T2 =  (y2) d2
P2 = d2
where d2 and y2 take their second-best levels. Given that ySB2 > y
FB
2 and
dSB2 < d
FB
2 , it is not di¢ cult to see that the tax and the pension will be here
of smaller size in comparison with the rst-best levels:
TSB2 < T
FB
2
PSB2 < P
FB
2
The decentralization of the second-best requires also a tax on the sin good for
type-2 agents, but this tax will now take a lower level than under the rst-best.
Indeed, the FOC for optimal second-best y2 is
v0(y2) = 1  0(y2)

1  
n2

[u(d2)  u0(d2)d2]
Comparing this with the FOC under laissez-faire yields an optimal tax SB2 :
SB2 =  0 (y2)

1  
n2

(u(d2)  u0(d2)d2) > 0
Given that 1  n2 < 1, we have
SB2 < 
FB
2
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Thus the second-best tax on the sin good is smaller than the rst-best tax, as
the incentive-compatibility constraint tends to counteract the correction of the
myopia: in order to prevent type-2 agents from pretending to be of type-3, we
have to weaken the tax on the sin good.
Finally, as in the rst-best, those policies fT2; P2; 2g do not su¢ ce to de-
centralize the social optimum. Some lump sum transfers across agents are also
needed, to satisfy the above FOCs. We shall not explore here those transfers
in details, but it is clear that, in the light of what was stressed above, type-3
agents tend, in comparison with the rst-best, to transfer more resources to
type-2 agents, as their rst-period consumption is reduced with respect to the
rst-best, whereas the opposite holds for type-2 agents.
5 Double heterogeneity and linear taxation
In the previous sections, we assumed uniform incomes, which allowed us to
obtain a simple and intuitive tax formula on the sin good. The analysis was
restricted to a simple self-selection constraint, which prevents the myopic from
mimicking the rational risk-taker. However, it is clear that if there was not only
a heterogeneity regarding individual attitudes towards sinful consumption, but,
also, heterogeneous earning capacities, then the design of the optimal tax on sin
goods would be more complicated. This section considers that problem.
For that purpose, we introduce here di¤erential wages wi. Thus, each indi-
vidual variable will now be indexed by the letter i for the wage rate wi, and
by letters j = 1; 2; 3 for farsightedness, myopia (with regrets) and impatience
(without regrets).
In order to make the analysis more tractable, we shall here focus on a linear
taxation scheme, with non-individualized taxation instruments. Note that, as
type-2 agents save nothing under the laissez-faire, a standard subsidy on savings
cannot help decentralizing the optimum, as it is ine¤ective in the context of a
corner solution under the laissez-faire. Hence, we shall, throughout this section,
use the following taxation instruments: a at tax  on earnings, a demogrant
a, a tax  on the sin good, and a pension benet P .
5.1 The agentsdecisions
Under a quadratic disutility of labor, the problem of an agent of type ij is to
maximize:
wi`ij (1  ) + a  sij   yij (1 + ) 
`2ij
2
+ v (yij) + ij (yij)u

sij
 (yij)
+ P

where `ij denotes the labor of agents of type ij, while ij denotes his actual level
of farsightedness. As above, we shall assume that i1 > 0 and i2 = i3 = 0.
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From individual optimization, we have
`ij = wi(1  ); j = 1; 2; 3
si1 = si1( ; a; ; P )
sij = 0; j = 2; 3
yij = yij( ; a; ; P ); j = 1; 2; 3
Note that the labour supply decision does not depend on whether the agent
is farsighted, myopic or impatient, but depends only on the wage level and on
the tax rate. Here again, type-2 and type-3 agents do not save, whereas the
savings of type-1 agents is a function of the policy instruments.
5.2 The planners problem
As above, we use ij for the actual level of farsightedness and ij for the time
preference factor used by the social planner. We assume that i2 = i3 = i3 =
0 and that i1 = i1 = i2.
We write the problem of the social planner by means of the following La-
grangian:
$ =
X
nijV
"
w2i (1  )2
2
+ a  sij   yij (1 + ) + v (yij)
+ij (yij)u

sij
ij
+ P

+ 
X
nij
 
 (1  )w2i + yij   a   (yij)P

where nij is the proportion of individuals of type j with productivity wi, the
optimal labor supply `ij = wi (1  ) is substituted in, and  is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the revenue constraint.
From the FOCs for an interior maximum and using the envelope theorem,
we obtain the following FOCs, for respectively a,  , P and :X
nijV
0 (xij)+
X
ni2V
0 (xi2) i2
@yi2
@a
+
X
nij


@yij
@a
  1  0 (yij) @yij
@a
P

= 0
 
X
nijV
0 (xij)w2i (1 )+
X
ni2V
0 (xi2) i2
@yi2
@
+
X
nij

(1  2)w2i + 
@yij
@
  0 (yij) @yij
@
P

= 0
X
nijV
0 (xij)ij (yij)u
0(dij)+
X
ni2V
0 (xi2) i2
@yi2
@P
+
X
nij


@yij
@P
  0 (yij) @yij
@P
P    (yij)

= 0
 
X
nijV
0 (xij) yij+
X
ni2V
0 (xi2) i2
@yi2
@
+
X
nij

yij + 
@yij
@
  0 (yij) @yij
@
P

= 0
where i2  i20(yi2)u(di2) < 0 denotes the utility loss that is due to the
myopia of type-2 agents.
In order to interpret those conditions, we shall look at the e¤ects of alter-
native pairs of instruments, holding the others equal to 0. For example, we
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consider the pairs ( ; a), (P; a) and (; a), a variation in one policy instrument
being compensated by a change in the other instrument in such a way as to
maintain the budget equilibrium.
For the pair ( ; a), the compensated Lagrangian can be dened as
@ ~$
@
 @$
@
+
@$
@a
da
d
=
@$
@
+
@$
@a
(1  2)
X
nijw
2
i
where the second term accounts for the e¤ect of a change in the tax rate  on the
rst-period demogrant, under the governments budget equilibrium constraint.
Substituting for the above FOCs and equalizing to zero yields
@ ~$
@
=  (1  )
X
nijV
0 (xij)
h
w2i  
X
nijw
2
i
i
 
X
nijV
0 (xij)
X
nijw
2
i +
X
ni2V
0 (xi2) i2
@~yi2
@
= 0
where @~yi2=@ denotes the e¤ect of a change of  on the sin good consumption of
type-2 agents, when that change is compensated by a change of the demogrant
a in such a way as to maintain the governments budget equilibrium.
Regarding the pair (P; a), the compensated Lagrangian can be dened as
@ ~$
@P
 @$
@P
+
@$
@a
da
dP
=
@$
@P
  @$
@a
X
nij (yij)
where the second term accounts for the e¤ect of a change in the pension P on
the rst-period demogrant, under the governments budget equilibrium.
Substituting for the above FOCs and equalizing to zero yields
@ ~$
@P
=
X
nijV
0 (xij)ij (yij)u
0(dij) 
X
nijV
0 (xij)
X
nij (yij)
+
X
ni2V
0 (xi2) i2
@~yi2
@P
  
X
nij
0 (yij)P
@~yij
@P
= 0
where @~yij=@P denotes the e¤ect of a change of P on the sin good consumption
of agents of type ij, when that change is compensated by a change of the
demogrant a in such a way as to maintain the governments budget equilibrium.
In the case of the pair (; a), the compensated Lagrangian is
@ ~$
@
 @$
@
+
@$
@a
da
d
=
@$
@
+
@$
@a
X
nijyij
where the second term accounts for the e¤ect of a change in the tax  on the
rst-period demogrant, under the governments budget constraint.
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Substituting for the above FOCs and equalizing to zero yields
@ ~$
@
=  
X
nijV
0 (xij) yij +
X
nijV
0 (xij)
X
nijyij
+
X
nijV
0 (xij) i2
@~yi2
@
+ 
X
nij
@~yij
@
= 0
where @~yij=@ denotes the e¤ect of a change of  on the sin good consumption of
type-2 agents, when that change is compensated by a change of the demogrant
a in such a way as to maintain the governments budget equilibrium.
With those simplications, we can now obtain a formula for each tax instru-
ment, keeping in mind that the other instruments are, in each case (except the
demogrant), set equal to zero.19
 =
 cov  V 0 (x) ; w2+Pni2V 0 (xi2) i2 @~yi2@
 cov (V 0 (x) ; w2) + EV 0(x)Ew2
P =
 cov (V 0 (x) ; ) P2;3 nijV 0(xij) (yij) (1  iju0(P )) +Pni2V 0 (xi2) i2 @~yi2@P
 E0(y) @~y@P
 =
 cov (V 0 (x) ; y) +Pni2V 0 (xi2) i2 @~yi2@
 E @~y@
In order to interpret the formulae of the optimal tax instruments  , P and
, let us rst examine the structure that is common to all those expressions.
The denominators of those expressions reect the e¢ ciency e¤ect of the tax
instrument: for  , the e¤ect of  on aggregate labor supply; for P , the e¤ect of
pensions on longevity, and, for , the e¤ect of the tax on the sinful consumption.
Obviously, the larger those e¤ects are, the lower the tax instruments should be
ceteris paribus.
In the numerators, the covariance terms reect the equity e¤ect of the tax
instrument. The covariance terms are likely to be negative, and are closely
linked to the concavity of V (x). Actually, we expect agents with a higher x to
be also more productive, to live longer, and to consume more sin good (even
though this latter point is more debatable). This leads to negative covariance
terms, which tend, in the present framework, to raise the optimal levels of
the tax instruments. The higher the covariance terms are in absolute value,
and the larger the optimal values of tax instruments are, everything else being
unchanged.
The terms including i2 - the utility loss due to myopia - at the numera-
tors indicate how the tax instruments induce myopic agents to choose the right
amount of sin good y. Those terms depend on the e¤ect of a rise in the instru-
ment on sin good consumption when this is compensated by a change in the
transfer a in such a way as to maintain the budget equilibrium. The sign of
19We use here the E operator for expected values.
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those compensated changes @~yi2=@, @~yi2=@ and @~yi2=@P is likely to be nega-
tive, but it is not easy to see how large those compensated changes are. Note
that the size of the terms including i2 depends also on how sizeable the type-2
group is: the larger that group is, the larger the social planners concern for
those agents is, and thus the more the optimal tax instruments will reect the
correction of type-2 agentsmyopia.
Finally, there is the second term of the numerator of the P formula, which
has to be distinguished between types 2 and 3. For type-3 agents, i3 = 0, and
thus this term is positive, pushing P down. For type-2, it is negative (i2 > 0),
and pushes P up.
5.3 Which uniform tax on sin goods?
Having described the major features of the optimal levels of  , P , and , let
us now investigate what those formulae tell us for the optimal taxation of sin
goods in our real market economies. As shown above, the optimal level of sin
goods taxation depends on three major determinants: (1) how reactive average
sin good consumption is to the tax (i.e. the denominator); (2) how large the
correction of the myopia induced by the tax is (i.e. the terms including i2);
(3) how correlated sin good consumption and individual welfare are (i.e. the
covariance term).
Regarding point (1), sin good consumption seems, in general, relatively little
elastic to changes in the tax, implying a low denominator, which would support
the necessity of a large tax . This intuition for a low elasticity is conrmed
by the literature on the price elasticity of the demand for cigarettes, which
yields estimations ranging between -0.3 and -0.5. For instance, Lewit and Coate
(1982) estimated an (uncompensated) price elasticity of -0.42, while Chaloupka
and Wechsler (1997) estimated an (uncompensated) price elasticity of -0.58.20
Those relatively low elasticity values support, from the point of view of e¢ ciency,
a large taxation. Note, however, that if myopic agents are also little sensitive to
sin good taxation, then, by point (2), it would not make sense to tax sin good
too much, which reduces the optimal  ceteris paribus. The little reactivity of
sin good consumption to taxation seems thus to yield ambiguous results in terms
of sin good taxation: on the one hand, the low elasticity makes the taxation of
that good e¢ cient, but, on the other hand, the perspectives of lowering, through
the tax, the welfare loss due to myopia are also reduced.
Moreover, regarding the second term of the numerator of  [i.e. point (2)], it
appears that the optimal tax on the sin good is also larger if a large proportion of
the population su¤ers from myopia (i.e. a large ni2). In other words, the extent
to which sin good consumers formulate regrets or not ex post a¤ects the optimal
tax to a large extent. As stressed in Section 1, the proportion of regret-makers
is, in the light of various studies, especially large among smokers - about 80 to
20More recently, Grignon (2007) nds, in France, a price elasticity of starting smoking equal
to 0.203, meaning that higher prices tend to delay smoking initiation less than proportionally.
The population having hyperbolic time preferences exhibits a slightly larger price elasticity of
staring smoking, equal to 0.347.
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90 % of the smokers population - (see Slovic, 2001; Jarvis et al, 2002; Fong et
al, 2004). Such a large proportion of smokers with regrets supports a large ni2,
and, thus, as far as cigarette is concerned, a large tax rate. Under such a high
proportion of regret-makers (i.e. type-2 agents), the tax on cigarettes would be
mainly driven by the task of reducing the welfare burden from myopia.
Finally, it should be stressed that point (3) may tend to play in the oppo-
site direction, that is, towards a lower taxation of the sin good. Clearly, if sin
goods are mainly consumed by agents with a low productivity, then the term
cov (V 0 (x) ; y) is positive, which would support a subsidization rather than a
taxation of sin goods in the name of equity concerns, and play against the other
concerns defended above. If one takes, once again, the example of cigarettes,
the existing literature supports that smoking prevalence is clearly decreasing
with the education level, and, thus, with productivity. For instance, in the
U.S. (2007), the lowest rates of smoking prevalence are found among under-
graduates (11.4 %) and graduates (6.2 %).21 Moreover, independently from
education, the individuals whose earnings are below the federal poverty lines
exhibit also a larger average smoking prevalence than the ones whose earnings
are above the poverty line (28.8 % against 20.3 %).22 All those gures sug-
gest that cov (V 0 (x) ; y) might be positive, which would tend to lower, ceteris
paribus, the optimal tax on cigarettes.
All in all, the design of the optimal uniform tax on sin goods is not trivial,
as there seem to exist tensions between, on the one hand, e¢ ciency concerns
and myopia reduction, which support a heavy taxation of the sin good, and, on
the other hand, equity concerns, which tend to lower the optimal tax rate.
6 Conclusions
This paper aimed at studying the optimal taxation of sin goods, in an economy
where sin good consumption follows from di¤erent motivations, but where ex-
ternalities are absent. In general, there exist, in such an economy, at least three
justications for a uniform treatment of sin good consumers by governments:
(1) old paternalism (sin goods are "bad" for everyone); (2) Good Samaritan
e¤ect (the State anticipates that it will have, in ne, to help the persons in
need, whatever their responsibility is); (3) informational imperfection at the
governments level (impossibility for policy-makers to distinguish between dif-
ferent motivations behind a given choice). The present study focused on the
third justication, and left the two other ones aside.
We showed that informational imperfection does not su¢ ce, on its own, to
justify a uniform treatement of all sin goods consumers. For that purpose, we
considered, in Section 2, a heterogeneous population of agents, some agents
being farsighted, others being risk-takers with regrets, while others are risk-
takers without regrets. Under the laissez-faire, a high consumption of sin goods
may result from various concerns, which cannot be regarded as equivalent by
21Data: the National Health Interview Survey 2007.
22Data: the National Health Interview Survey 2007.
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governments, as some risky behaviors lead to regrets, while others do not. As a
consequence, the social optimum involves a di¤erentiated treatment of rational
risk-takers and inconsistent ones, so that some type-specic taxation on sin
goods is required to decentralize the social optimum (see Section 3). It was also
shown that the second-best optimum, although introducing some distorsions
with respect to the rst-best (to avoid pooling equilibria), would nonetheless
still recommend a di¤erentiated treatment of sin goods consumers, depending on
the motivations underlying their choices (see Section 4). An interesting feature
of the second-best optimum is that it would not only interfere with myopics
choices, but, also, bring a lower utility to rational risk-takers, to prevent the
former from pretending to be the latter.
Hence, if some theoretical support is to be found for the existing uniform
treatment, by the governments, of all smookers, drinkers, fast-drivers, and risk-
takers of all kinds, this cannot be in the informational constraints faced by
governments. On the contrary, this theoretical support must lie either in old
paternalism, or in the Good Samaritan e¤ect. Whereas the former seems hardly
defendable, the latter does not seem to provide a strong support for a uniform
treatment of all sin goods consumers, but seems to invite, on the contrary, fur-
ther research on how a government could make its commitments more plausible,
making thus a di¤erentiated treatment possible again.
Those conclusions, which support the need for a di¤erentiated treatment
of sin good consumers having di¤erent motivations, were drawn under the as-
sumption of a full homogeneity of earnings in the population, which is a strong
simplication. Actually, as we showed in Section 5, under a set of linear taxation
instruments, the introduction of heterogeneity in individual earnings tends to
complexify the optimal intervention of the government even more. The reason
for those additional di¢ culties lies in the potential conicts between, on the one
hand, e¢ ciency concerns and myopia correction, and, on the other hand, equity
concerns, as sin goods are likely to be more consumed by agents with lower
earnings. The former concerns support a high taxation of sin goods, while the
latter support the opposite, so that the optimal sign and level of the uniform
tax on sin good is ambiguous.
In sum, this paper emphasizes not only that the existing uniform taxation
of sin goods cannot be justied on the grounds of informational imperfection,
but, also, that such a uniform treatment is likely to be quite costly in terms
of social justice. Actually, if the correlation between earnings and risk-taking
behaviors is negative rather than positive, correcting uniformly for a myopia
may be in strong opposition with basic equity concerns. Hence the limitation
of the governments tools to a uniform tax may not only penalize non-myopic
risk-takers, but may also penalize the myopic ones. Heterogeneity in earnings
consists thus of an additional reason for a di¤erentiated treatment of risk-takers.
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